This report presents a formal speci cation in the Z notation for a safetycritical control system. It describes a particular medical device but is quite generic and should be widely applicable. The speci cation emphasizes safety interlocking and other discontinous features that are not considered in classical control theory. A method for calculating interlock conditions for particular operations from system safety assertions is proposed; it is similar to ordinary Z precondition calculation, but usually results in stronger preconditions. The speci cation is presented as a partially complete framework that can be edited and lled in with the speci c features of a particular control system. Our system is large but the speci cation is concise. It is built up from components, subsystems, conditions and modes that are developed separately, but also accounts for behaviors that emerge at the system level. The speci cation illustrates several useful idioms of the Z notation, and demonstrates that an object-oriented speci cation style can be expressed in ordinary Z.
Introduction
Safety-critical control systems are often advocated as ideal applications for formal software development methods 1]. However, there are very few published examples of formal speci cations for real safety-critical systems that have been built and used. Those few are expressed in notations that are not in wide use (for example, 5]).
The complexity of a real control system confronts the speci cation writer with problems of style and organization whose solutions are not apparent from most small case studies found in the literature. Examples of formal speci cations for realistic control systems might serve as models, or reusable frameworks 3], that could be adapted to other projects.
The large literature on control theory (for example, 2]) emphasizes continuous, closedloop controls. It provides little guidance regarding discontinuous, essentially \open-loop" operations such as turning subsystems on and o , and safety interlocking. Such features dominate the requirements for many safety-critical systems, including our own.
Researchers concerned with safety issues have proposed abstract formal models of process control systems that provide criteria for evaluating speci cations for desirable properties such as completeness and safety 10, 13] . This work challenges builders of real systems to provide speci cations that are su ciently formal to support such evaluation.
This report describes a framework for formal speci cations of safety-critical control systems, and demonstrates its application to a real medical device. Some of our preliminary work was reported in 6].
A case study
The Clinical Neutron Therapy System at the University of Washington is a cyclotron and treatment facility that provides particle beams for cancer treatments with fast neutrons, production of medical isotopes, and physics experiments. The facility was installed in 1984, and includes a computer control system provided by the cyclotron vendor 15] . Devices under computer control include a 900 amp electromagnet and a 30 ton rotating gantry, as well as four terminals at three operator consoles. The control system handles over one thousand input and output signals, and includes six programmable processors as well as some nonprogrammable (hard-wired) controls.
The University is now developing a new, successor control system. This development project is motivated by requirements to make the system easier and quicker to use, easier to maintain, and able to accomodate future hardware and software modi cations.
We have mostly completed an informal speci cation, which is being produced with the participation of the therapists, physicists and engineers who use and maintain the facility. It will comprise about 500 pages of prose and diagrams 8, 9] , and documents the requirements expressed in the formal speci cation. We hope that the formal speci cation will be much shorter and will serve as the primary guidance for software development.
A framework for safety-critical systems
A framework is formal model that abstracts the central features of a family of applications, which can be adapted or extended to t the needs of particular projects 3]. Our speci cation is presented here as a partially complete framework that can be edited and lled in with the speci c features of di erent control systems.
State variables, control laws and safety assertions
Reviewing our prose speci cations 8, 9], we nd that most of our requirements can be expressed by a quite simple framework: a system is a collection of state variables that must obey certain control laws and safety assertions. This can be modeled by a Z state schema.
The state variables are named in the schema declaration and can be discrete indicators or numeric quantities. The control laws and safety assertions are system invariants which appear as schema predicates. Control laws are formulae that relate state variables in a way that produces the intended system behaviors. In classical control theory 2], control laws are usually di erential equations that relate continuous variables, but our control laws also include discrete variables and logical connectives. Safety assertions are formulae that place additional constraints on the state variables, as required by considerations of human safety and equipment protection.
As an example of this framework, here are some de nitions and a (much simpli ed) state schema for our cyclotron. The schema shows a few of the state variables and laws concerned with the radio-frequency (RF) ampli ers that accelerate the particles, the magnet that con nes them, and the shielding door that protects sta and visitors from scattered radiation. The particle beam is considered to be on whenever the RF drive ampli ers are on. When the main magnet eld is o , its current is zero; when it is on, its current is held at a nominal preset value (this magnet also has a disabled state from which it cannot be turned on, and an error state where it has been turned on but is not running correctly). The safety assertions say that the beam can only be on when the vault door is closed and the main eld is running within its nominal range.
This report does not describe how the state variables are input, output, or transformed between their values in meaningful engineering units and their low-level representation as bit patterns in device registers. Those vital activities are the subject of another report 7].
Operations
The control system provides a repertoire of operations that can change the values of some state variables. These are modeled by Z operation schemas.
For example, this operation turns on the main eld power supply, unless it has been disabled. This illustrates a common technique for writing concise operation de nitions: the variables explicitly changed in the operation schema drive other variables, as dictated by the control laws. Therefore, operation de nitions usually do not include predicates that x the values of variables that are not explicitly changed.
Interlocks
A distinguishing feature of safety-critical control systems is that many operations are interlocked; they are not allowed to proceed if certain potentially hazardous conditions exist. In our framework, interlocks are preconditions for operation schemas. If a precondition is not satis ed, the interlock is set or active, and the operation must not proceed; otherwise the interlock is clear.
Consider the operation invoked by pressing the BEAM ON button. Here is a naive speci cation.
TurnOnBeam Cyclotron
This schema says that pressing the BEAM ON button when the RF system has not been disabled will attempt turn on the RF drive ampli ers (it cannot be guaranteed that they will turn on; they may indicate an error).
This de nition is not consistent with the intent of the system safety assertions. Additional interlocks should prevent the beam from turning on if the vault door is not closed, or the main eld current is outside its nominal range.
It seems that it should be possible to calculate the interlock conditions from the system safety assertions. However, the ordinary Z precondition 16, 14] is too weak; for example, it does not include door = closed. We cannot calculate any ordinary Z precondition involving door because we cannot require that the value of door remain the same in the \before" and \after" states; door is an input sensor whose value may change at any time.
To achieve the intended e ect, the interlock predicates should be chosen to ensure that the \after" state of the operation schema (the state formed by the primed schema variables) will be sure to satisfy the system state invariant even when the values of all the sensor variables remain the same in the \before" and \after" states.
We can state this formally, by making a stronger version of the usual Z precondition expression: from the state schema S, extract the schema Sensor that consists only of the declarations of the state variables that represent sensors whose values cannot be directly controlled. This is necessary because safety assertions typically involve these sensors. Then the interlock precondition for operation Op is given by the schema expression It is useful to compare the interlock conditions computed from the state schema by this method to the interlocks recommended by the designers, based on their understanding of the system. Disagreement may indicate that the system safety assertions are not complete (or are too restrictive), or the operation is not fully described.
There are legitimate reasons why the computed interlock conditions might not agree with designers' recommendations. It is sometimes necessary to add interlocks beyond those entailed by the system safety assertions, in order to prevent certain transitions between states, even though the states themselves are sometimes permitted.
Limitations of the basic framework
The basic framework presented in section 3 can describe most of our requirements, but it is not very useful as a practical speci cation style. Its disadvantages arise because all the system state variables appear in a single state schema. Real process control systems have hundreds or thousands of state variables. Moreover, the number of operations and the speci cation for each would have to be very large because there are so many variables and conditions to consider.
A framework based on components
Most of our system's size derives from repetition of similar components. We can make our speci cation much shorter and easier to grasp by identifying the components, describing them separately, and then combining them. Each kind of component is speci ed using the basic framework presented in section 3, with its own state, operations, and interlocks.
Each kind of component can be considered an abstract data type or, to use the terminology of the popular object-oriented programming movement, a class. Several notations based on Z add constructs intended to support object-oriented programming 17]. We nd that ordinary Z 16] serves well as a notation for specifying object-oriented programs.
The following sections describe some components we have found useful for our application. Subsequent sections show how the component speci cations are combined into a system speci cation.
Analog control parameters
The three state variables main d setpoint; main d preset; main d current that appeared in the Cyclotron schema in section 3 reveal a pattern that appears in many other contexts. We de ne a schema for this recurring pattern, which we call a control parameter or simply a parameter (in this report we use the word \parameter" in this sense, not the programming languages sense). 
Power supplies and servomotors
Many of the state variables in our system are devoted to about forty power supplies that provide current to the magnets that con ne, focus and steer the beam. The main eld supply discussed in section 3 is just one of these. Here is a slightly more realistic generalization; this model also includes the contactor that connects the supply to its power source, and represents the various faults that induce the disabled and error states. The control law says that current cannot ow when the contactor is open. The safety assertions say that we must not try to drive current when faults exist or the contactor is open. For each class of component, there is a set that names all the components of that class. The rst group of predicates says that the roster of components in the system is xed. Therefore, each maplet of the form name 7 ! Component can be regarded as a persistent object. This is a central idea in our object-oriented speci cation style for Z.
All of the state variables and most of the predicates from the basic framework are now inside the various components, so the system state schema can be much smaller. However, laws that relate state variables in di erent components can only be expressed at the system level. These include the two safety assertions discussed in section 3.
Some useful idioms
Specifying the operations of a system described this way requires several constructions in the Z notation that are not obvious. We call them idioms. These idioms are not described in the reference manual 16] nor taught in textbooks 14]; they must be gleaned from case studies 12] or technical reports 11]. Here are two useful ones.
Promotion
Much useful behavior can be modeled at the component level. However, methods de ned at the component level are not, by themselves, meaningful at the system level. For example, at the system level it makes no sense to merely turn on a power supply; it is necessary to say which supply. Component-level operations that must be made available at the system level can be adapted by applying a Z idiom called promotion 12, 11]. The additional interlock preconditions here could have been calculated from the system safety assertions by the method described in section 3.3.
Operations on multiple components
Other system level operations are obtained by performing the same method on multiple components. For example, a common operation is turn on all the power supplies in some subsystem, say Beam Line A. This is provided at a single button, to save the operator the trouble of switching each supply on individually. In addition to components, we use a few other ideas to organize the speci cation.
Other authors have noted the usefulness of conditions and modes 5]. Subsystems are also helpful.
Subsystems
The various subsystems include the RF system, the cyclotron proper, the three beamlines, the two treatment rooms, etc. Each is simply a collection of components, identi ed by their names. rfsys; cyclo; bla; blb; blc; iso; x : NAME
Conditions
It is useful to de ne schemas to abbreviate conditions that appear frequently in the speci cation. 
Modes
Our cyclotron can be operated in di erent modes. Each mode is characterized by the destination and purpose of the beam. The beam can be delivered to two treatment rooms or an isotope production station. It can be used to treat patients, or for experiments and testing.
Modes are a kind of condition, for example:
IsoTest Cyclotron
Isocentric room, test mode : : :
Modes are important because the control laws and safety assertions depend on which mode is selected. In order to turn on the beam in a room, the beam line to that room must be ready, and di erent safety interlocks must be cleared to treat a patient than to run an experiment with no people in the room. This is expressed by using modes and other conditions to write the control laws and safety assertions. 8 User interface
Our complete speci cation will include a schema for every operation that users can invoke which might change the values of any state variables. Therefore, we must write a schema for every control panel button and every on-screen menu selection.
Our complete speci cation will also include some schemas for operations that occur spontaneously when the values of certain sensor variables change. Turning o the beam at the end of a treatment, when integrating sensors indicate that the prescribed dose has been delivered, is one example.
When users attempt operations that are interlocked, the system state does not change. Pressing the BEAM ON button turns on the RF drive if all the interlocks relevant to the selected mode are clear; otherwise, nothing happens. Therefore, the full speci cation for this and every other operation must be total; they must cover both possibilities. This is expressed:
The active interlocks, conditions and modes are displayed at the control console so operators can see which operations are enabled.
Our speci cation implicitly determines that some sequences of operations are permitted and others are not possible, because in most states some variables act as interlocks to inhibit certain operations. Users may select operations in any sequence they wish, subject only to the sequencing constraints imposed by the preconditions. There is no other \ ow of control."
Graphic notations such as state transition diagrams can help make sequencing con-straints clear, and might be a useful complement to the Z texts.
The translations between internal state variable values and their representations in user interface devices such as analog meters or workstation displays are among the input/output operations that we have formally speci ed in another report 7]. Other details | whether a particular operation is invoked by pressing a button on a control panel, or selecting a menu option at a workstation | are described in prose and diagrams 9]. We do not believe it would be useful to formally specify the \look and feel" aspects of the user interface.
9 Progress report and preliminary evaluation
At this writing (September 1992) our formal speci cation is not complete, but we are con dent that all functional requirements documented in the informal speci cation 8, 9] can be formalized using techniques described in this report (and a few more that we have omitted for brevity). All that remains is to nish lling in the framework.
We have only attempted to formalize the functional aspects of our system. The Z notation does not provide built-in facilities for representing time or concurrency. If we decide to formalize these features we will select a notation suited for them.
Much of the e ort in developing large applications like ours is devoted to enumerating the system state variables and describing the operations that must be provided, taking care that nothing is omitted and no inconsistencies are introduced. The Z notation provides a discipline for organizing this work that is supported by a de-facto standard 16], several good textbooks, and robust tools for document preparation, syntax and type checking.
Z is particularly e ective for systems whose size derives from repetition of components which are not identical but share many features in common. The Z schema calculus permits recurring features to be described with texts that apply to all, supplemented with brief texts that address the di erences. As a result, de nitions such as SafeTurnOnBeam in section 7.3 can be quite compact even though they actually describe hundreds of state variables.
We have already found the formal texts to be useful as descriptive documentation. We hope their brevity will help us build an economical implementation. The pos-sibility that they might also support safety analyses and formal development of the implementation is an additional bonus.
